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Estate of CHARLES HENRY STONE RULE, Deceased.
ALEX McCLUSKEY, Respondent, v. WALLACE L.
\V ARE et aI.. as Executor~. et.c;. Appellants.
[1] Decedents' Estates - Executors - Powers - Contracts- With
Brokers.-Prob. Code, § 7BO, declaring that by the execution
of a contract between an executor and a broker to secure a
purchaser no personal liability shall be attached to the executor and no liability shall be incurred by the estate "unless
an actual sale is made and confirmed by the court," clearly
indicates that the sale is not regarded as "made" until it is
confirmed by the court. Hence, strictly speaking, the purchaser cannot be regarded as "secured" until the sale h.as been
confirmed, nor is the contract valid or binding for any purpose
until the sale is confirmed.
[2a,2b] Brokers-Compensation-Appeal-Review of Edivence•...;..
In a probate proceeding involving the allowance of a broker's
commission, it was for the determination of the trial court
whether a contract addressed to the broker and signed by the
executors,when read in the light of .conflicting inferen'ces to
be drawn from the contract and- the surrounding circ'umstances,
evidenced an intention to provide for payment of a .commis~
sion to the broker for hi~ pa~t Rerviees in securing a certain
(1) See HB Cal.Jur. 51;.21 Am.Jur. 505.
McK. Dig. References: [I. 9-12, 15] Decedents' Estates, § 265;
[2) Brokers, §160; [3] Appeal and Error, §1172; [4] Contracts,
UBI; [5] Attorneys, § 25; [BJ Brokers, § 23; [7J Brokers, § 56;
[8J Brokers. § 53; [13] Statutes. § 192 it [14] Brokers,§ 158.
25 C.2d-l
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the executors and in favor of the broker, where it was reasonable for the trial court to conclude, in the light of all the
circumstances, that the appraiser was an agent of the executors rather than that he represented the broker; and tl)e con- '
tract which, the trial court presumably found,. was prepared
by the appraiser in a spirit of fairness to the broker, was also
construed against the executors rather than against the broker.

person as a bidder and prospective purchaser, or whether the
contract contemplated payment for future services only; and
the court's decision may not be interfered with on appeal.
Appeal-Presumptions-Findings.-In the absence of findings
of fact and conclusions of law, every intendment is in favor
of the judgment or order appealed from, and it is presumed
that every fact or inference essential to the support of the
order and wRrrRnted by the evidence was found by the court.
Contracts-Interpretation-Functions of Courts.-An appellate court will accept or adhere to the interpretation of a contract adopted by the trial court Rnd not substitute another of
its own, where parol evideuce is introduced in aid of interpretation of the contract. and where said evidence is such that
conflicting inferences may be drawn therefrom.
Attorneys-Relation to Client-Imputation of Knowledg~.
Knowledge of an attorney for executors is imputed to the
executors,
Brokers-Employment-Contracts Reduced to Writing After
Performance.-A contract employing a broker to procure a
purchaser for property of an estate. although signed by the
executors after the broker's services were performed insofar
as procuring the purchaser's bid was concerned. but before
such bid had ripened into a confirmed sale, was legally suffi~
cient to satisfy the requirements. if any. of R written authorization.
Id.-Compensation--Ratification of Broker's Acts-Acceptance
of Beneflts.-The acts of executors in accepting the benefits of
a broker's services by petitioning for confirmation of a sale of
property to the purchaser, after definite notice that the broker
was the procuring cause of such purchaser's bid. and in thereafter executing a written contract authorizing the broker to
procure a purchaser for the property, constituted ratification
of the broker's acts as agent of the executors. and thus enttitled the broker to his commission.
Id. - Compensation - Construction of Contra,ct.-On appeal
from an order allowing a broker's commission on sales of
estate property. a lette; from an inheritance tax appraiser to
the executors' attorney, which accompanied the form of a
written contract, later signed by the executors, authorizing
the broker to procure a purchaser. was construed against

[3] See
[4] See
146,147.
[5] See
[7] See
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[9] Decedents' Estates-Executors-Powers-Contracts~ With
Brokers-Sale on IncreasedPrice.-The authorization to pay
the commission allowed by Prob. Code. § 761, in case of sale on
an increased bid made at the time of confirmation to a purchaser not procured by the agent holding the contract, is fixed
by law and the amount must be fixed by the court. Neither the
obligation nor the amount is dependent on any express or
written contract. Rnd t.he statute of frauds has no application.
[10] Id. -'- Executors - Powers - Contracts - With Brokers-Construction of Instrument.-In a probate proceeding involving
the allowance of a broker's commission, a letter from an inheritance tax appraiser to the executors' attorney, which ac~'
companied the form of a contract, later signed by the executors, authorizing the broker to procure a purchaser for ,the
estate property, supported the implied views of the trial court
that the appraiser and the attorney would advise and secure
for the broker a contract seemingly necessary for a commission under Prob. Code, § 760, rather than one apparently unnecessary for a commission under § 761, where the appraiser
wrote "I have advised him [the broker] that for hisprotection he should have a formal listing from the executor before
making a bid in court."
[11] Id. - Executors - Powers - Contracts - With Brokers-Construction of Statute.-Prob. Code, § 760, authorizing an executor to enter into a written contract with any bona fide agent
to secure a purchaser for property of the estate, does not limit
the power of an executor to that of contracting to pay for
services to be performed by the agent in the future, as it is
apparently contemplated by the statute that the contract shall
not create any obligation until the sale is confirmed: h'ence
execution of the contract at any time prior to actual confirmation of the sale would appear to answer the requirements of
the law.
[12] Id. - Executors - Powers - Contracts - With Brokers-Construction of Statute.-Prob. Code, § 760, directing that a contract between an executor and an agent "shall provide for the
payment to such agent out of the proceeds of a sale to any
purchaser secured by him of a commission," is broad enough
to include any prospective purchaser previously solicited to

2 Cal.Jur. 852, 870; 10 Cal.Jur. 741; 3 Am.Jur. 516.
6 Cal.Jur. 327; 4 Cal.Jur. Ten-year Supp. (1943 rev.)
1 Cal.Jur. 846;'3 Cal.Jur. 611; 5 Am.Jur. 302.
4 Cal.Jur. 578; 8 Am.Jur. 1032.
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whom a sale is eventually confirmed. A bidder is not actually
a purchaser within the meaning of the statute until the sale
to him has been confirmpil.
[13] Statutes-Construction-Code Provisions.-Provisions of the
Probate Code are to be liberally construed with a view to
effecting its objects and promoting justice.
[14] Brokers - Compensation - Appeal- Presumptions.-On appeal from an order allowing a broker's commission on sales of
estate property, the trial court was presumed to have found
that the parties by their contract intended that in case a sale
to the purchaser was confirmed, the broker was to be paid a
commission out of its proceeds.
[15] Decedents' Estates - Executors - Powers - Contracts-With
Brokers-Presumptions.-In a probate proceeding involving
the allowance of a broker's commission, in testing the validity
of a contract, signed by executors, authorizing the broker to
procure a purchaser for property of the estate, it was presumed that the executors were acting fairly and by way of discharge of what they conceived to he their fiduciary ohligations.

APPEAL from an order 'lf the Superi'lr C'lurt 'lf Sonoma
County all'lwing a commission on sales of property of a decedent's estate and directing payment there'lf. Hilliard Comstock,Judge. Affirmed.
Young, Hudson & Rabinowitz for Appellants.
Barrett & McConnell and A. Dal Th'lmson for Respondent.
Breed, Burpee & Robinson as Amici Curiae 'ln behalf 'lf
Respondent.
SCHAUER, J.-This is an appeal by the executors of the
last will and testament 'lf Charles H. S. Rule, deceased, from
an order 'lf the probate court fixing and allowing a broker's
commission, and directing payment thereof by the executors,
to respondent real estate broker Alex MoOluskey, \1pon the
sales to a purchaser secured by respondent of certain real
and personal property of the Rule estate. The substance of
appellants' contenti'ln is that the evidence fails to supP'lrt the
interpretati'ln which the trial C'lurt (sitting in pr'lbate) placed
UP'ln a written C'lntract between appellants and resP'lndent
relative to the pr'lcurement of a purchaser, and that therefore such court erred in allowing respondent a commission
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Qn the sales. We have concluded that the evidence is not as
a matter of law insufficient t'l sUPPQrt any essential implied
finding and that the Qrder appealed frQm must be affirmed.
The resP'lndent Alex McCluskey, dQing business under the
firm name and style Qf McCluskey RealtyCQmpany, Santa
RQsa, CalifQrnia, at all times cQncerned was a duly licensed
real estate brQker and his son C. E. McCluskey was aJicensed
salesman emplQyed by the father. They carried Qn.their busi~
ness cQrrespondence on statiQnery with letterheads shQwing
their profession. As early as January 16, 1942,resPQndent
or his son and agent, 'ln their letterhead stationery, wrote to
H. S. YQung, an attorney whQse firm waR emplQyed as the attorneys for the executors in this estate and whQ was handling
the estate matters on behalf of his firm, stating that "Mr. TQm .
Brownscombe, Attorney here in Santa Rosa, gave us your
name stating that y'lU were the att'lrney fQr the Charles Rule
estate. \Ve have tW'l 'lr three substantial cash buyers for stQck
ranches and W'luld like to know at an early date if the Rule
Ranch at Jenner is f'lr sale and your best price. The writer
has been on the ranch several times and we feel that we are
fairly familiar with same." On January 20 Mr~ YQung replied as follows: "In response to your, letter of January 16th,
I beg to encl'lse herewith prospectus on the Rule Ranch. Any
cattleman who buys this ranch would take Qver theregistrati'lns for the Hereford breeding stock and the well knQwn
g'lQd will." The prospectus, which, in effect, is an QbviQUS
sales talk and invitati'ln for bids on the property, accQmpanied
the letter.
In August, 1942, in continuation Qf the negotiations which
had been opened in .January, the agent on behalf Qf the realty
C'lmpany, 'ln its letterhead, wrQte to Young fQr, and the latter
in resPQnsemailedtQhim.aninventQry Qf the livestQck and
equipment Qn the Rule Ranch. In the m§l:tntime t4e fl-gent h,fl-q
contacted one LoulM T. WilU", lu~d jiJu(!c@@d@d in int@tieMtlnr
him in 'PurClhaling the property a.nd.. d.urinA' the tatie 'Plft
Qf August, was, with the father. respondent herein, enga~ed·
in assisting Willig to obtain financing fQr the purchase. On
August 24 Willig, whQ had jUl'lt learned that Qne Qf the executQrs was one W. P. Wobber,a personal acquaintance of his,
inquired Qf the agent whether the .latter WQuld . QbjectJ:!: ,he,·
Willig; saw WQbber persQnally concerning the prQperty; 'and
received the. agent's permission tQdo SQ. There was no sug-
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gestion that either Willig or the agent intended that by permitting the personal contact the latter should be understood
to waive his obvious expectancy of earning and receiving a
commission on any sale which might ensue to his client. The
agent and Willig thereafter made arrangements to meet at
the former's office (that of the McCluskey Realty Company)
in Santa Rosa on September 2, 1942, and then to proceed to
a nearby bank to discuss financing of the proposed purchase.
Willig failed to appear at the real estate office the morning of
the date set, and in the afternoon the agent inquired of the
bank whether Willig had been there. He was informed that
Willig had come to the bank that morning (September 2),
that they had "gotten together" on the financing, and that
Willig had stated he was not going to file a bid through the
realty company-through whose efforts, as related; his interest
in the ranch had been aroused and who had carried on the
preliminary negotiations which led to the financing arrangements. The agent forthwith telephoned Young, attorney for
the executors, and informed him "that Mr. Willig had not
kept an appointment with us that day and that I telephoned
Mr. Fuller [the banker] and had asked him if Mr. Willig had
been there and he stated that he had. And I further asked
him [Fuller] if they had gotten together on any financing
and he told me they had. And I then-and also that I had
been advised by Mr. Fuller that Mr. Willig had stated he
wasn't going to file a bid through us. . So I told Mr. Young
that we very definitely wanted to register Mr. Willig's name
with him and Mr. Young told me to write him, accordingly,
so he should be sure he would have it the following morning,
which morning, I believe, was the date the bids were to be
opened, so I did so, and sent it special delivery." (Italics
added. ) The letter written by the agent to Young was dated
September 2, 1942, and reads as follows: "On January 20th
you wrote us, enclosing a prospectus of the Rule Ranch, offering it for sale. With this authority, we contacted Mr. L. J.
Willig, 38-8th St., San Francisco, and have for some little
time discussed the ranch with him. When Mr. Thomas
Brownscombe of Santa Rosa [who apparently was acting as
an agent or representative for the executors] advised us that
bids under the probate sale were being solicited we immediately sought to interest Willig in filing a bid. It seems that
following our conversation in this regard he contacted Mr.
'Vobber and was advised that .•. no real estate brokers

..
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had been invited to solicit bids upon the property. [If this
statement was made by WobbeI' the trial court could have
found that it was untrue, as is shown by the correspondence
above quoted in which Mr. Young, as agent for the executors,
impliedly invited the claimant here to solicit a bidder for the
property.]
"Upon Tues., Aug. 25, we again contacted Mr. \yillig, by
appointment, and discussed the possibilities of financing' the.
purchase and the amount of his proposed bid. In the mean- .
time we had ascertained from one of our local banks what .
they would loan him on the property. Yesterday, Sept. 1, we
'phoned Mr. Willig, making an appointment to meet him at
our office following an interview he proposed to have with
Mr. Fuller, Pres. of the Bank of Sonoma County at Sebastopol. Mr. Willig failed to appear at our office and upon our
'phoning Mr. Fuller we were advised that Mr. Willig had·
told him of our contact with him but that . . . he was going
to file directly with Mr. WobbeI'.
"We feel very definitely that under the circumstances if
Mr. Willig does file a bid it should be regarded as being subject
to our commission." (Italics added.)
Under date of September 5, 1942, Yourig replied as follows:
"I have your letter of September 2nd. The executors have
not yet made any return on the Rule Ranch sale, so as I write
this letter it is questionable as to who will be the successful·
bidder. While it is most agreeable to us to deal with brokers
nevertheless this bid came directly from the purchaser and
not through any broker, as a net bid. I think you will fully
understand as the attorney for the estate there is nothing I
can do concerning your commission." (Italics added.) The
statement in the above quoted letter that "this bid came di- .
rectly from the purchaser and not through any broker" is
apparently true only in a limited and technical sense. The
evidence amply supports a finding that the bid came through
the efforts of the broker who contacted and interested the
bidder and carried on negotiations with him as shown above.
The statement that the proposal came "as a net bid" is, of
course, a conclusion of the writer of the letter, not binding
on Mr. McCluskey or the court.
On September 12, 1942, the executors, knowing that the
broker had actually procured the bid and that he would claim
a commission on the sale if confirmed, through Young's law

'.
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firm filed in the probate court two returns of sale-one of the
ranch and the other of certain stock and other personal property thereon. The returns recited that Willig had become the
prospective purchaser of the real property for $75,000 and of
the personal property. for $20,000, and prayed that the sales
to him be confirmed. Oourt hearings thereon were set for
September 25.
On September 22 the above mentioned Mr. Thomas M.
Brownscombe, an attorney and inheritance tax appraiser in
Santa Rosa, at whose office the executors in this estate had
specified that bids for the . ranch property should be filed,
wrote to Young in San Francisco as follows: "Dear Harry:
Mr. Alex McOluskey, a broker of this city, has one or more
prospective purchasers for the Rule ranch and personal property. I have advised him that for his protection he should
have a formal listing from the executor before making a bid
in court. Accordingly I enclose herewith a form of contract
to be signed by the executor. If it meets with your approval
would you kindly have it signed and return it to me."
The form of. contract referred to in this letter was, under
date of September 23, 1942, signed by the two executors, and,
prior to the hearings on September 25 of the petitions for
confirmation of the proposed sales, was delivered to the respondent. It is addressed to the respondent, dated September
23, 1942, and the body of it reads as follows:
"This will authorize you to procure a purchaser for the
real and personal property of the estate of OHARLES H. S.·
RULE, deceased, a petition for the confirmation of the sale
of which has been heretofore filed in the Superior Court of
Sonoma County. A commission will be paid you out of the
proceeds of a sale to any purchaser secured by you in an
amount to be fixed and allowed by the court upon confirmation of the sale." It is signed, "Very truly yours, Wallace
L. Ware Executor. W. P. WobbeI' Executor."
Obviously the executors in signing the quoted contract did
not regard the property as having been actually sold. No
other bids were made at the time of the court hearings on
September 25, and on that date Mr. Willig's bids were considered by the court and the sales to him confirmed. By
stipulation of the parties the hearing on respondeht's application for broker's commissions was continued to October 2.
Subsequent continuances placed the actual hearing on such'

•
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~pplication on November 27,1942. In the meantime the ·e~ecu~.
tors filed a third return of sale, reciting that certain additional
personal property on the' ranch had been sold by them to
Willig for $2,300 and praying confirmatioh of the sale. Hearing on such return was also set for November 27, and on that
date the sale to Willig was confirmed. On December 22. 1942,
the court, having received evidence. including the correspondence above quoted and the testimony of Mr. C. E. McCluSkey
and Mr. H. S. Young, without written findings made its order
that a broker's commission of $4,865 (five per cent of the
total sales price of $97,300) be. allowed to respondent and
that the executors forthwith pay to respondent such commission out of the proceeds of the sales then in the hands of the
executors.
Appellants contend:
First, that the contract embodied in the letter of Septem.
bel' 23, 1942, addressed to respondent broker and signed by
the two appellant executors evidences no intention by the
executors to pay to respondent a commission for services which
the latter had already performed, viz., the procuring of
Willig as .a bidder and prospective purchaser for the estate
property; and that such contract should be construed as referring to future or other bidders to be produced by respondent.
Second. that, in any event, the authority granted appellants by section 760 of the Probate Code to contract to pay a
commission to a real estate agent out of the proceeds of the
sale of estate property to any purchaser secured by such agent
is by the terms of that section limited to services to be performed and purchasers to be secured by the agent in the
future, and that appellants were without power to contract
to pay for services already rendered by an agent.
[1] Section 760 of the Probate Code, upon which each of
the parties hereto relies, provides as follows: "The executor
or administrator may enter into a written contract with any
bona fide agent to secure a purchaser for any real or personal
property of the estate, which contract shall provide for the
payment. to such agent out of the proceeds of a sale to any
purchaser secured by him of a commission the amount of
which must be fixed and allowed by the court upon confirmation of the sale; and when said sale is confirmed to such purchaser, such contract shall be binding and valid as against the

10
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estate for the amount so allowed by the court. By the execution of any such contract no personal liability shall attach to
the executor or administrator, and no liability of any kind
shall be incurred by the estate unless an actual sale is made and
confirmed by the court." (Italics added.) The above italicized language providing against liability "unless an actual
sale is made and confirmed by the court" clearly indicates
that in the contemplation of the statute the sale is not regarded as "made" unless and until it is confirmed by the
court. Hence, strictly speaking, the purchaser cannot be regarded as "secured" until the sale has been confirmed. nor.
by the other italicized language of the section, is the contract
valid or binding for any purpose unless and until the sale is
confirmed.
[2&] Appellants, in support of their first contention-that
the contract by its own words clearly contemplates payment
to respondent for futures services only-urge the right of the
trial court in construing the contract to consider the "surrounding circumstances and the matter to which" the contract relates, and particularly the expressions contained in
the letter of September 22 to Young from Brownscombe
(whom appellants designate as respondent's attorney and
agent) with which the contnct form was forwarded to Young
for signing by appellant executors. The fact is, however. that
the trial court had before it and undoubtedly did consider
evidence of the surrounding circumstances, including the
Brownscombe letter, and yet determined that respondent
broker was entitled to his earned commission. [3] And. in
the absence of findings of fact and conclusions of law, every
intendment is in favor of the judgment or order appealed
from and it is presumed that every fact or inference essential
to the support of the order and warranted by the evidence
was found by the court. (See Haime v. de Beaulieu (1942),
20 Oa1.2d 849, 852 [129 P.2d 345] ; Belcins Van Lines, Inc. v.
Johnson (1942),21 Oal.2d 135, 137 [130 P.2d 421] ; Estate of
Shaw (1927), 85 Oal.App. 518. 525 [260 P. 351]; 2 Oal.Jur.
852, § 499; 10 Oal.Jur. 741; § 62.) [2b] Whether, in the
light of the conflicting inferences to be drawn from the evi.
dence, the parties by their contract intended to provide for
the payment to respondent of a commission for his past services-which had not yet matured into a confirmed sa1e and
which, hence, in one sense, were services in course of renditi?n-in securing Willig as a bidder and prospective pur-

chl1£er, or contemplated payment for future services only, was
for the determination of the trial court and its decision may
not be interfered with by us on appeal. [4] The rule is that
an "appellate court will accept or adhere to the interpreta·
tion [of a contract] adopted by the trial court-and not substitute another of its own- . . . where .parol evidence was
introduced in aid of its interpretation, and such eviden~e . . .
h such that confiicting inferences may be drawn therefrom."
(4 Oal.Jur. 10·Yr. Supp. (1943 rev.) 146-147, § 192; see also
2 Oal.Jur. 934-939. § 549.) Oertainly inferences may be drawn
from the contract and the surrounding circumstances here
which would support the finding which we must presume was
made by the trial court relat.ive to the intention of the contracting parties.
.
[5] From the date of the first communication (January,
1942) between respondent or his agent on the one hand and
Young, as attorney for the executors, on the other, it was
known to Young and through him to the executors (1 OaI.·
JUl'. 846-847. § 125; 3 Oal.Jur. 611, § 25; Laukkare v. Abramson (1935), 9 OaI.App.2d 447, 449 r50 P.2d 478] ; Smith v"
Thomsen (1935), 8 Oal.App.2d 603, 606 [48 P.2d 102]) that
respondcnt's realty company was interested in securing a pur- .
chaser for the estate property and in thereby earning a commission. [6] The evidence shows that Mr. Young, and, con~
sequcntly, the executors. knew at the time Willig's bid was reo
ceiver1 that he had been secured by respondent as a prospective purchaser and they (Young and the executors) had been
specifically notified. prior to the time that they determined
to aCtlept Willig's bid and prior to their filing in court of the.
petitions to confirm the sales to him. of that fact and of the
fact that respondent claimed to be ~ntitled to a commission
for his services performed Thereafter appellant executors,
filed the petitions for confirmation arid. prior to the hearing'
on such petitions, executed the contract under which the trial,
court presumably awarded a commission to respondent. It
has been consistently held in this state. following the. language of Mu,ir v. Kane (1909), 55 Wash. 131. 135~136 r104
P. 153, 19 Ann.Oas. 1180, 26 L.R.A. N.S. 519] that "The moral
obligation to pay for services rendered as a broker in selling
real estate under an oral contract. where the statute requires,
such contract to he in writing. is just as binding as is the
moral' obligation to pay a debt that has become barred by the
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statute of limitations; and there is no reason for holding that
the latter will support a new promise to pay while the former
will not. There is no moral delinquency that attaches to an
oral contract to sell real property as a broker. This service
cannot be recovered for because the statute says the promise
must be in writing, not because it is illegal in itself. It was not
intended by the statute to impute moral turpitude to such
contracts. The statute was intended to prevent frauds and
perjuries, and, to accomplish that purpose, it is required that
the evidence of the contract be in writing; but it is not conducive to either fraud or perjury to say that the services re~
dered under the void contract or voluntary will support a
subsequent written promise to pay for such services." (Italics added.) See Coulter v. Howard (1927),203 Cal. 17,22-23
[262 P. 751]; In re Balfour & Garrette (1910), 14 Cal.App.
261, 265-266 [111 P. 615] ; Can'ington v. Smithers (1915), 26
Cal. App. 460, 463-464 [147 P. 225]; Kinney v. Jos. Herspring
& Co. (1921), 53 Cal.App. 628, 638 [200 P. 737]; Pryor v.
McGuire (1922), 59 Cal.App. 234, 239-240 [210 P. 532];
Johnson v. Krier (1922). 59 Ca1.App. 330, 332 [210 P. 966].
Consequently the contract executed after the services of respondent were performed insofar as procuring the making of
the bid was concerned. but before such bid had ripened into
a confirmed saJe, was legally sufficient to flatisfy the requirement, if any, of a written authorization.
[7] Moreover, the acts of the executors in accepting the
benefits of respondent's services by petitioning for confirmation of the sale to Willig (until which confirmation, as previously noted. there could be no binding obligation to pay a
·commission), after definite notice that respondent was the
procuring cause of Willig's bid, and in thereafter executing
the written contract of September 23. constituted ratification·
of the acts of respondent as agent of the executors in the
same manner (i. e.• in writing) as it is claimed was required
for a precedent authorization. and thus entitled respondent
broker to his commission. (See 4 CaJ..Jur. 578-579. ~ 22.)
[8] Appellants charge that certain expressions contained
in the letter of September 22 from Brownscombe. to Young
(which accompanied the form of written contract executed
September 23) indicate that the contract contemplated payment to respondent for future services only. that in writing
such letter and preparing the contract Brownscombe was act-
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ing as attorney and agent for respondent, that therefore respondent is bound by the letter, and that, moreover, 'the contract should be most strongly construed against respondent,
whose attorney, claim appellants, prepared it. The record,
however, is devoid of evidence (unless it is to be inferred from
the letter itself) that Brownscombe at any time acted as
either attorney or agent for respondent. On the contrary,
it was in Brownscombe's office that the executors had by. published notice specified that bids for' the estate property were
to be filed and the Return of Sale of Real Estate and Petition
for Confirmation alleges that the sale was made "at the place
specified in said notice. to wit: care of Mr. Thomas M.
Brownscombe, Exchange Bank Building, Santa Rosa, California." It W;1S logical and reasonable for the trial court to
conclude, in the light of all the circumstances, that Brownscombe waR an agent of appellants rather than that he represented respondent. Therefore, thE' language of Brownscombe's letter must be construed against appellants and in
favor of respondent. Likewise the contract which was executed by appellants certainly is not necessarily shown to have
been formulated by respondent or by anyone acting as his
agent or representative. It was forwarded to Mr. Young
by Mr. Brownscombe and, the trial court presumably found.
was prepared by Mr. Brownscombe in a spirit of fairness to
Mr. McCluskey, although acting as the agent of the executors ...
Fair dealing in private transactions is to be presumed. (Code
Civ. Proc., § 1963 (19).) Such contract, therefore, also is to
be construed against the appellant!'! rather than against
respondent.
[9] It may also be noted that although appellants argue
that the contract was prospective only and was intended by
the parties thereto to cover only future services to be redered by respondent, i. e., the production of increased bids
in court at the time of hearing on the petitions for confirmation of the sales to Willig, no express contract is required by
the Probate Code in order to entitle to a commission a broker
producing a purchaser to whom. upon an increased bid in
open court. the sale is confirmed. Under such circumstances.
by the provisions of section 761 of the Probate Code, such
broker is entitled to commission on the full purchase price
for which the sale i!'! confirmed. les!'! one-halI of the commi!'!sion on the original bid. The authorization to pay this com-
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mission is fixed by law and the amount must be fixed by the
court. Neither the obligation nor the amount is dependent
on any express or written contract. The commission is simply allowed as a judicial act, an incident of an order of the
court confirming the sale. The statute of frauds has no application, as the right to the commission is not based on a· contract, at least not on any express contract. (Prob. Code,
§ 761; see, also, Halleck v. Guy (1858), 9 Cal. 181, 195 r70
Am.Dec. 643J.) Both Brownscombe and Young were attorneys practicing their profession in this state, and it may have
seemed more probable to the trial judge that they would participate in advising and securing for Mr. McCluskey a con.
tract seemingly necessary for a commission under section 760
rather than one apparently unnecessary for a commission under section 761.
[10] The language of Brownscombe's letter, previously
mentioned. support!'! the implied views of the trial court.
In the letter Mr. Brownscombe says, "I have advised him
[Mr. McCluskeyJ that for his protection he should have a
formal listing from the executor before making a· bid in court.
Accordingly r enclose herewith a form of contract to be signed
by the executor. If it meets with your approval would you
kindly have it signed and return it to me." (Italics added.)
While conflicting inferences may be drawn it is apparent· that
the trial court could have considered as significant the fact
that Mr. McCluskey. would need no protection in the shape of
a written contract for a commission on a sale which might be
cotlfirmed to a new bidder in open court on proceedings initiated to confirm a sale to a, previous bidder. No "approval'"
by Mr. Young or the executors would be necessary to entitle
him to the commission OIl such a proceeding. f.Jikewise the
statement in the Brownscombe letter that Mr. McCluskey had
"one or more prospecth-e pUrchaser!'! for the Rule rancll and
personal property" was a prOpel" and correct reference to
Mr. Willig and, the trial court was warranted in finding, Mr.
Young and the executors knew it. Willig, obviously, was a
"prospective purchaser" until the proposed sales to him had
been confirmed. The statement in the letter that in Mr.
Brownscombe's opinion Mr. McCluskey should have "a formal
listing . . . before ,making a bid in court" may be presumed
to have been interpreted by the trial court as referring to the
actual presentation in court of Mr~ Willig's bids in asking
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confirmation thereon. The fact that Mr. Young had previously written respondent that "this bid came directly -from
the purchaser and not through any broker . • . I think you
will fully understand as the attorney for the estate there is
nothing I can do concerning your commission," did not preclude him from subsequently recognizing the technicality of
his .own position and the apparent fairness and justice of re"
spondent's claim or from changing his mind and advising
his clients to execute the contract.
[11] Appellants seek to sustain their second contentionthat, as executors, they were without authority to contract
to pay a commission to respondent for the' procuring of a.'
purchaser whose bid had already been returned to the court
for confirmation-by reliance, upon the doctrine, enunciated
in Perry v. Superior Oourt(1938), 29 Cal.App.2d 114,_ 116
[84 P.2d 250], that "the administration of the estate of deceased persons is purely statutory, and the procedure outlined in the statutes is controlling. When the powers an.d'
duties of the administrator are fixed by statute there is no
inherent right to assume or exercise any power not conferred,
or to depart from the procedure outlined." (See, also, 11a
Cal.Jur. 86-87, § 35.) They assert that the opening words
of section 760 of the Probate Code, i. e., "The executors . . .
may enter into a written contract with any bona fide ageilt to
secure a purchaser for any real 'or personal property of the
estate," limit the power of an executor to that of contractinlf
to pay for services to be performed by the agent in the fu~'
ture and that he is not empowered to agree to pay for past.
services-in this case the procuring of a bid which appellant
executors had accepted but which the court had not yet col'l~
firmed. Respondent,. however, urgef!l' that a purchaser ha~"
not been "secured" within., the meaning of section 760 until,
a sale ,has been. completed' by court confirmation and: fixing' ,;
of the amount of commission to be ailowed, and· that' tiritit·
that time the executors may execute the contract 'authoriied'
by the sectlon and may thereby bind the estate to the pay~"
:ment of the commission fixed by the court upon confirmatio:r1.'
Actually, the estate is not bound by any such contract until
and unless the proposed sale is confirmed by the court and
then the commission is payable only out of the proceeds of
the· sale. , The section in question itself provides that uwken'
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said sale is confirmed to such purchaser, such contract shall
be binding and valid as against the estate." (Italics added.)
It apparently is contemplated that the contract shall not
create any obligation until the sale is so confirmed. Hence
execution of the contract at any time prior to actual confirmation of the sale would appear to answer the requirements of
the law. [12] Furthermore, it is to be noted that the section directs that the contract "shall provide for the payment
to such agent out of the proceeds of a sale to any purchaser
secured by him of a commission . . . " (Italics added.) This
language is broad enough to include any prospective purchaser previously solicited to whom a sale is eventually confirmed. A bidder is not actually a purchaser within the
. meaning of the statute until the sale to him has been
confirmed.
In Wilson v. Fleming (1930), 106 Cal.App. 542, 549 [289
P. 658], the court in construing the first two paragraphs of
section 1559 of the Code of Civil Procedure (the same, except for immaterial changes, as present Probate Code section 760), held that "not until . . . a deed is passed and a
mortgage or deed of trust taken for such payments as are
deferred, has a sale been actually comple,ted within the meaning of section 1559 [of the Code of Civil Procedure]." And
as defined .by Webster's New International Dictionary (1943
ed.), "to secure" is "to acquire certainly." In 56 Corpus
Juris 1275~1276 the verb "secure" is stated to mean "to
acquire certainly, . . . to confirm."
[13] Moreover, provisions of the Probate Code are to be
liberally construed with a view to effect its objects and to
promote justice. (Estate of Paterson (1939), 34 Cal.App.2d
305, 315-316 [93 P.2d 825].) It appears that such a construction was adopted by this court in the recent case of Estate of
Mitchell (1942), 20 Ca1.2d 48 [123 P.2d 503], in which a
broker was awarded a commission on a sale of estate property
to a purchaser secured by him under a contract (in the form
of a letter) which failed to make expreSs provision for payment of any commission whatever, either out of proceeds of
the sale or from any other source. In affirming the award
this court, speakip.g through Mr. Justice Shenk,stated (pp.
50-51), "Although the parties did not expressly provide for
a commission it is not seriously questioned that a commission
was intended if a sale was consummated and confirmed by
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the court. The exchange of letters clearly indicated that a
commission waH contemplated. A st.atement therein of the
amount of the commission would be nugatory, for the reason
that the statute requires the court to fix thecommission upon
the confirmation of the sale.... Furthermore the words, , [the
contract 1 shall provide for the payment to such agent out of
the proceeds of a sale to any purchaser secured by him of a
commission ... ' as used in this section [Prob. Code, § 760]
are not necessarily mandatory.•.. [Po 52] We conclude that
the statute effects the inclusion of the limitation in the contract and that failure to include it in the writing does not
render the contract void."
[14] In the instant case the
trial court must be presumed to have found that the parties
by their contract of September 23 intended that in case
the sale to Willig was confirmed respondent· was to be paid
a commission out of i.ts proceeds. The evidence and the law
support the conclusion that in so executing such contract the
executors .acted fairly and did not transcend their authority.
[15] In testing the validity of the contract and the obligationof the estate in this proceeding it is also presumed that
they are acting fairly and by way of discharge of what they
conceive to be their fiduciary obligations as executors.
For the reasons above stated the order appealed from is
affirmed.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Curtis, J., and Carter, J., concurred.
TRAYNOR, J.-I dissent. The majority opinion holds that
this court is bound by the implied interpretation of the agreement of September 23, 1942, by the trial court, because
"[conflicting] inferences may be drawn from the contract and
the surrounding circumstances." . The very possibility of
what the majority opinion calls conflicting inferences, actu~
ally conflicting interpretations, far from relieving the ap~
pellate court of the responsibility of interpretation, signalizes
the necessity of its assuming that responsibility. It is established that in the absence of conflicting extrinsic evidence
the appellate court must make its own" interpretation of the
instrument, displacing the interpretation of the trial C(lurt
if they are inconsistent. (Estate of Platt, 21 Ca1.2d '343, 352
[131 P.2d 825] ; Moffatt v. Tight, 44 Cal.App.2d 643, 648 [112

~
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P.2d 910] ; Mitchel v. Brown, 43 Cal.App.2d 217, 222 [110
P.2d 456] ; Texas 00. v. Todd, 19 Cal.App.2d 174 [64 P.2d
1180J; Wall v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc., 33 Cal.App.2d 112
[91 P.2d 145] ; see O'Oonnor v. West Sacramento 00., 189 Cal.
7, 18 [207 P. 527] ; Oalifornia W. D. 00. v. Oalifornia M. O.
00., 178 Cal. 337,341 [177 P. 849]; Brant v. Oalifornia
Dairies, Inc., 4 Ca1.2d 128, 133 [48 P.2d 13]; 5 C.J.S. 32, 722,
751.) If the extrinsic evidence is conflicting, the trial court,
having seen and heard the witnesses, is in a better position
to evaluate that' evidence, and its interpretation of the instrument is ordinarily conclusive. (See 111 A.L.R. 742.)
Even then, however, the appellate court will determine the
reasonableness of the trial court's interpretation based on
its findings as to extrinsic facts. (Melvin v. Berendsen, 7 Cal.
App.2d 389,391 [46 P~2d 189]; Ballsun v. Star Petroleum
00., 105 Cal.App. 679, 685 [288 P. 437]; Fowle v. Bigelow,
10 Mass. 379.)
In interpreting a written agreement, the court must ascertain the meaning of the words and other manifestations of
intention forming the agreement. (Restatement: Contracts:
§ 226; 3 Williston, On Contracts [1936] p. 1726.) It must
consider the usual meaning of the words, the circumstances in
which they were used, and the reasons for their use. This
function is a judicial one, even though it "may not involve
any question of law in the exact sense" (Thayer, Preliminary
Treatise on Evidence, p. 204) to be exercised according to the
generally accepted canons of interpretation so that the main
purpose of the instrument may be given effect. (See Civ.
Code, §§ 1635-1661; Code Civ. Proc., §§ 1856-1866.) Factual
and legal elements are so closely interwoven that there can be
no effective review of the trial court's interpretation unless the
appellate court goes through the whole process of interpretation. Otherwise conflicting decisions of trial courts, in the
event one party has made identical agreements with other
parties, would have to be affirmed by the appellate courts,
which would be bound by any number of conflicting interpretations of the same agreement.
In the present case there was no conflict in the extrinsic
evidence. This court is therefore bound to make its own interpretation of the agreement of September 23, 1942. That
agreement was the only one existing between the parties, for
the correspondence between respondent and the attorney for
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the estate before September 23, 1942, consisting Qf requests 'fat
information by the respondent and answers by the exeClitorsj
'did not constitute a contract authorizing or employing "ref
spondent to procure a purchaser. (ilforrillv. Barneson,i 30,
Cal.App.2d 598 [86 P.2d 924]; Lambert v. Gerner, 142 CaL.
399 [76 P, 53]; Kleinsorge & Heilbron v. Liness, 17 Cal.App. ,,'
534. 536 [120 P. 444]; see 4 CaLJur. 554.) The agreemeniof'
September 23, 1942, read in the light of the previousrejectiori
of respondent's claim for a commission on the, sales to Willig
and the Brownscombe'letter with which the form, of contract .
signed by them was sent to the executors,' is open to ,only;
one reasonable interpretation, namely, that it authorized :respondent to procure a new pur:chaser and promised a coin. ' 0 '
mission payable out of the proceeds of any sale to such pur·
chaser. The text of the agreement, authorizing respondent
to procure a purchaser and promising a commission in the
event of a sale to such purchaser. could not relate to Willig,
who had already bought the property and severed his' relationship with respondent. It clearly shows that the partieR
intended to provide for a commission for future and not for
past services. Any doubt as to that intention is removed
by the Brownscombe letter: "Mr. Alex McCluskey, a broker
of this city, has one or more prospective purchasers for the
Rule ranch and personal property. I have advised him for
his protection he should have a formal listing from the executor before making a bid in court." Since Willig at that time'
was known to both parties to have purchased the property
subject to confirmation by the court and to have severed his
relationship with respondent, he was neither a purchaser
whom respondent "has" nor "one or more" purchaserS nor
a "prospective purchaser." The advice that respondent secure a formal listing for its own protection before "making a
bid in court" undoubtedly related to the provision in section
785 of the Probate Code allowing the court in its discretion
to accept a bid of at least ten per cent more than the price
named in the return of sale, if made to the court by a responsible person before confirmation of the return sale. A promise
of a commission in this event was .I1ot necessary as the majority opinion assumes, for section 761 of the Probate Code
limits the commission to one-half only if there are two brokers,
one who has procured the original purchaser, 'and the other
who has procured the purchaser who makes the higher bid.
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If .there is oilly one broker, namely the one who secured the
purchaser making the higher bid on which a confirmed sale
is made, section 761 would not apply and the broker would
be entitled to the full commission if he had secured a written
contract pursuant to section 760. Moreover, it cannot be as~
sumed that the parties believed that a written promise of a
commission was unnecessary with respect to bids in court.
In the absence of other authority clearly in point, Srownscombe may have relied for his advice on the statement in California Jurisprudence (11B Cal.Jur. 53 § 667), a widely used
encyclopedia of California law, that brokers, who procure a
bid in court on their own responsibility, cannot be allowed a
commission out of the estate, citing Hickman-Coleman Co. v.
Leggett, 10 Cal.App. 29 [100 P. 1072]; Estate of Strybing,
5 Cof.Prob.Dec. 438. The parties were properly advised to
remove any uncertainty in this respect by executing the
instrument in question. If respondent had intended that the
instrument provide for a commission for the sale to Willig,
he would have said so, assuming of course that he did not intend to lull the executors into the belief that the agreement
related to the procuring of a new purchaser and to use the instrument as a basis for a claim for a commission on the Willig
sales. Such an intent would be of no avail, for respondent
could not attain by a trick what had been denied him when
he asked for it. (Civ. Code, §§ 1640, 1649, 1654; Code Civ.
Proc., § 1864; Brant v. California Dairies, Inc., 4 Ca1.2d 128,
133 [48 P.2d 13]; Pacific Lumber Co. v. Industrial Ace. Com.,
22 Ca1.2d 410, 422 [139 P.2d 892]; McClintick v. Leonards,
103 Cal.App. 768, 774 [285 P. 351] ; see 4 Cal. Jur. Ten-year
Supp., 1943 revision, 135.)
Tlle record show'S that respondent at the trial vigorously objected t.o the admission of the Brownscombe letter in evidence.
Since 11e now contends that the letter was not admissible it is
necessary to determine the question whether the letter w~s admissible as extrinsic evidence in aid of the interpretation of
the agreement of September 23, 1942. Respondent contends
that the promise of a commission in the instrument of September 23rd covered the sares to Willig and that in view of the
clear, common meaning of the language used, the promise cannot be otherwise interpreted. Even if it be assumed that the
instrument of September 23rd would seem unambiguous to a
read.er unfamiliar with the circumstances surrounding its executIOn, appellants wol1ld not be precluded from showing the
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meaning intended by the parties, and the court could still'
interpret the instrument in accord with that int~ntion.
The main purpose of interpretation is to give effect to the'
intention of the parties at the time of contracting (Civ. Code,
§ 1636; Universal Sales Corp. v. California, etc., Mfg. Co., 20
Ca1.2d 751,760 [128 P.2d 665] ; Bader v. Coale, 48 Cal.App.2d
276 [119 P.2d 763]; see 6 Cal.Jur. 255. 4 Cal.Jur. Ten-year
Supp .• 1943 revision. 107). This purpose would be defeated if
it could not be determined what the parties meant when the
language of their coritract seems unambiguous to the genera]
reader unaware I)f the circumstances under which the contract
was executed, who bases his underAtanding of the language exclusively on his knowledge of the meaning of the words in
common usage. (Ermolieff v. R. K. O. Radio Pictures, 19 Cal.
2d 543. 550 [122 P.2d 31.) Though language that appears
unambiguous to the general reader gives rise to an inference·
that the partieA used the language in its ordinary meaning,.
the inference may be rebutted by evidence that· the parties
used the words in queAtion in a different sense. <Code Civ.·
Proc., § 1861: Civ. Code. § 1636: Weinstein v. Moers. 207 Cal.
534 [279 P. 444]; Shean v. Weeks. 176 Cal. 592 [169P 2:l1l;'
see McBaine, The Rttle· A_!Jainst Disturbing the Plain 11 Mn~
ing of Writings, 31 Ca1.L.Rev. 145. 149.) Otherwise "the
meaning of the peopie who did not write the document" would
deterniine it~ i.nterpretation (Ree 9 Wigmore. Rvidence. 4th;
. ed., § 2462), and the' intention of the parties might be nullV
fied (Weinstein v. Moers, supra, at p. 540) in violation of the
proviAionR of AectionR lR56.1860. 1861 of the Code of Civil '
Procedure and Rectiom: 1636 and 1647 of the Civil (lode~
which are applicable not only when an ambiguity appears
to the reader from the face of the instrument. but also when'
there is an "extrinAic ambiguity" .<code biv.Proc.,~'185G~
Rubd. 2), namely. an ambiguity th~t arises when theinRtrd~
ment iR read in the light oiaB thecircumstance.'1 surroundirtg
itF! prep&ration. (Pacific Indemnity Co. v. California Elecfric',
Works .• 29 Cal.Apn.2d 260:272 r84 P.2d 3131. )AA the United
States Supreme Court declared in Reed v. Merchant~'M1ttt
Ins. Co .• 95 U.S. 23. 30 r24 fJ.'Ed. 3481; "Although a written .
agreement cannot be varied by Addition or Rubtractioli :by
proof or the circumstances out of which it grew and which
Rui-rounded itA adoption. vet such circumstances ftre constantly.
reF!orted to for the purp~se of aAcertainingthesubject matte-r
and the Atandpoint of the partieA in relation thereto. Without
some knowledge derived from such evidence, it would be im-
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possible to comprehend the meaning of an instrument or the
effect of the words of which it is composed. This preliminary
knowledge is as indispensable as that of the language in which
the instrument is written." (See, also, Jenny Lind 00. v.
Bower 0; 00., 11 Cal. 194, 198.)
The extrinsic evidence admissible to furnish the preliminary knowledge necessary to an understanding of the language of the instrument comprises the evidence as to "circumstances surrounding the parti'9s at the time they con·.
tracted . . . including the object, nature and subject matter of the agreement . . . and the preliminary negotiations
between the parties" in order that the court may "place itself
in the same situation in which the parties found themselves at
the time of contracting." (Lemm v. Stillwater Land 0; Oattle
00.,217 Cal. 474, 480 [19 P.2d 7851; Civ. Code, § 1647; Code
Civ. Proc .. § 1860; Universal Sales 00. v. Oalifornia etc. Mfg.
00., supra, p. 761.)
The statement sometimes found in the cases that the
extrinsic facts are admissible only when a written instrument is ambiguous, simply means that the language used by
the parties must be susceptible to the meaning claimed to have
heen intended by the parties. (Balfour v. Fresno Oanal &
hr. 00.,109 Cal. 221 f41 P. 8761; Smith v. Carlston, 201) Oal.
541. 550 [271 P. 1091]; Barlow v. Frink, 171 Cal. 165. 172
[152 P. 2901; Kenney v. Los Feliz Investment Co .., Ltd., 121
Cal.App. 378, 386 f9 P.2d 2251; In re Smith's Will, 254 N.Y.
283 [172 N.E. 499.72 A.L.R. 8671; Goode v. Riley, 153 Mass.
585 [28 N.E. 228]; Restatement. Oontracts. § 242, comment a;
Holmes, The Theory of Le{ml lnterprrtrdion. 12 Harv.L.Rev.
417.420.) If the evidence offered would not persuade a reasonable man that the instrument meant anything other than the
ordinary meaning of its words. it is useless. (See Williston.
Contracts r rev. ed. 1936], § 629.) In the light of the foregoing principles. the Brownscombe letter was clearly admissible.
Since there was no written contract. as required by section
760 of the Probate Oode. to pay respondent a commiRsion on
the sales to Willig, the judgment should be reversed. The
rule that a broker must have a contract in order to recover
for his services. however beneficial they are to the principal.
if: necessary to protect the principal. who otherwiRe wonld
frequently be unable to determine whether the price agreed
upon with the purchaser incluclcil a commiRRion. (See Restatement, Agency, §§ 441 Comment (c), 448 Comment (f);
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Lasoya Oil 00. v. Jarvis, 191 Okla. 213 (127 P.2d 142, ;'142
A.L.R. 2701; 12 C.J.S. p. 134.) Section 760 of the Probate .
Code. has adopted this rule, adding the requirement that' the .
contract be in writing. This formality protects the broker
from competing claims of others, and the estate from "the
assertion of -false claims for compensation by brokers and
agents" (Kleinsorge 0; Heilbron v. Liness, 17 Cal.App.534, .
538 [120 P. 4441), which would otherwise be a source of litigation, that would sometimes result in the principal's paying.
the commission twice. (See Sel1.,age v. Talbott, 175Ind..648
f95 N.E. 114. Ann.Cas. 1913 C 724. 33 L.R.A. N. S.9731;
Barney v. Lasbury, 76 Neb 701 [107 N.W.989] : Annotation
17 A.L.R 891, 894.) The statute is vitiated. when the courts
allow a· broker to recover a commission in the absence <?f:~
written contract. (White v. Tl irschman, 54 Cal.App.2d· 573,
574 [129 P.2d 430]; Hicks v. Post~ 154 Cal. 22,.28 [96P.
878]; Jamison v. Hyde, 141 Cal. 109 [74 P. 695] ; Kleinsorge .
0; Heilbron v. Liness, S1.tpra, p. 538.)
.
Edmonds, .1., concurred.
Appellants' petition for a rehearing was denied November
13, 1944. Edmonds, J., and Traynor, J., voted for a rehearing.
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BYRON PEEBI.JER et aI., Respondents, v. B. C. OLDS et aI.,
Appellants.
[1]

Appeal_Supersedeas-Order of Supreme Court.-An appli.cation to the Supreme Court for a writ of supersedeas to stay
execution on a money judgment against defendants was
granted a.nd it was ordered that the writ should issue on the
approval of an nnd(>rtaking by the trial or presiding judge
of the superior ('ourt within R desig-nated time. where the
showing made by defendantR disclosed an attempt in good
faith to prevent execution on the jud!l;ment,. pending appeal,
by the filing of the required bond, the sureties on which had
sufficiently jnstifipd.

f11 See 2 Cal.Jur. 467.
McK. Dig. Reference: [1] Appeal and Error, § 430.

